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Abstract
We study a dynamic model in which the interaction between debt ac-
cumulation and asset prices magni￿es credit booms and busts. We ￿nd
that borrowers do not internalize these feedback e⁄ects and therefore suf-
fer from excessively large booms and busts in both credit ￿ ows and asset
prices. We show that a Pigouvian tax on borrowing may induce borrowers
to internalize these externalities and increase welfare. We calibrate the
model by reference to (i) the US small and medium-sized enterprise sector
and (ii) the household sector, and ￿nd the optimal tax to be countercycli-
cal in both cases, dropping to zero in busts and rising to approximately
half a percentage point of the amount of debt outstanding during booms.
JEL Codes: E44, G38
Keywords: boom-bust cycles, ￿nancial crises, systemic externalities,
macro-prudential regulation, precautionary savings
1 Introduction
The interaction between debt accumulation and asset prices contributes to mag-
nify the impact of booms and busts. Increases in borrowing and in collateral
prices feed each other during booms. In busts, the feedback turns negative,
with credit constraints leading to ￿re sales of assets and further tightening of
credit. It has been suggested that prudential policies could be used to mitigate
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1the build-up in systemic vulnerability during the boom. However, there are few
formal welfare analyses of the optimal policies to deal with booms and busts in
credit and asset prices.
This paper makes a step toward ￿lling this gap with a dynamic optimizing
model of collateralized borrowing. We consider a group of individuals (the
insiders) who enjoy a comparative advantage in holding an asset and who can
use this asset as collateral on their borrowing from outsiders. The borrowing
capacity of insiders is therefore increasing in the price of the asset. The price of
the asset, in turn, is driven by the insiders￿consumption and borrowing capacity.
This introduces a mutual feedback loop between asset prices and credit ￿ ows:
small ￿nancial shocks to insiders can lead to large simultaneous booms or busts
in asset prices and credit ￿ ows.
The model attempts to capture, in a stylized way, a number of economic
settings in which the systemic interaction between credit and asset prices may
be important. The insiders could be interpreted as a group of entrepreneurs who
have more expertise than outsiders to operate a productive asset, or as house-
holds putting a premium on owning durable consumer assets or their homes.
Alternatively, insiders could represent a group of investors who enjoy an ad-
vantage in dealing with a certain class of ￿nancial assets, for example because
of superior information or superior risk management skills. One advantage of
studying these situations with a common framework is to bring out the com-
monality of the problems and of the required policy responses￿ although, in the
real world, those policies pertain to di⁄erent areas such as ￿nancial regulation,
or individual and corporate taxation.
One of our main results is that the asset-debt loop entails systemic exter-
nalities that lead borrowers to undervalue the bene￿ts of conserving liquidity as
a precaution against busts. A borrower who has one more dollar of liquid net
worth when the economy experiences a bust relaxes not only his private bor-
rowing constraint but also the borrowing constraints of all other insiders. Not
internalizing this spillover e⁄ect, the insider takes on too much debt during good
times. We ￿nd that it would be optimal to impose a cyclical tax on borrowing
by leveraged insiders to prevent them from taking on socially excessive debt.
It is important that the level of the tax on a given sector be adjusted to its
vulnerability to credit and asset price busts. In a benchmark calibration of our
model to the US small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) sector, we ￿nd that
the optimal tax converges to 0.56 percent of the amount of debt outstanding
over the course of a boom, and drops to zero when a bust occurs. Borrowing by
the US household sector is subject to externalities of similar magnitude (0.48
percent in booms). By contrast, US Flow of Funds data over the past decade
suggest that large corporations who have access to corporate bond markets
were less subject to systemic externalities and did not require macro-prudential
measures.
We study four extensions of the basic model and ￿nd that its essential prop-
erties are preserved. First, we change the nature of the shock by assuming that
it a⁄ects the availability of credit rather than the income of insiders. Then we
look at the case where insiders can issue long-term debt or equity. All three of
2these extensions change some features of the boom-bust cycle equilibrium, but it
remains true that the constrained optimum can be achieved by a countercyclical
tax on debt, and this tax is of the same order of magnitude as in the benchmark
model. Finally, we compare ex ante prudential taxation to ex post interventions
that provide funds to constrained borrowers in a bust. We ￿nd that a bailout
insurance fund that accumulates resources in good times and transfers them
to debtors in a bust does not increase welfare (unless the resources are levied
through the optimal Pigouvian tax).
Our model is related to the positive study of ￿nancial accelerator e⁄ects
in closed and open economy macroeconomics. In closed-economy DSGE mod-
els, Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) and Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999)
show that ￿nancial frictions amplify the response of an economy to fundamental
shocks. However, models in this literature are traditionally solved by lineariza-
tion, making them more appropriate to analyze regular business cycle ￿ uctua-
tions than systemic crises. In the open economy literature, Mendoza (2005) and
Mendoza and Smith (2006), among others, have studied the non-linear dynam-
ics arising from ￿nancial accelerator e⁄ects during sudden stops in emerging
market economies. Mendoza (2010) focuses on the positive implications of such
dynamics in a framework with asset prices.
Benigno et al (2009) and Bianchi (2009) characterize welfare-maximizing
policies in such models. Their papers focus on the role of exchange rate depre-
ciations in emerging market crises and ￿nd an externality that involves the real
exchange rate rather than the price of a domestic asset. By contrast, our model
does not have an exchange rate and attempts to capture the essence of the prob-
lem in a generic setting involving asset price de￿ ation. Bianchi and Mendoza
(2010) analyze a similar externality mechanism for the aggregate US economy
but focus on the implications of credit constraints on labor demand, whereas
we emphasize the necessity to di⁄erentiate policy measures by the vulnerability
of each sector in the economy.
Our paper is also related to analyses of the ongoing world-wide credit crisis
that emphasize the amplifying mechanisms involving asset price de￿ ation and
deleveraging in the ￿nancial sector (e.g., Adrian and Shin, 2009; Brunnermeier,
2009). Some earlier contributions have clari￿ed the externalities involved in
credit booms and busts and drawn some implications for policy in the context
of stylized two- or three-period models (Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2003;
Lorenzoni, 2008; Korinek, 2009, 2010; Jeanne and Korinek, 2010). By contrast,
this paper gives a more realistic and quantitative ￿ avor to the analysis, by
considering an in￿nite-horizon model. This allows us to study macroprudential
policies over booms and busts and is particularly relevant for determining the
optimal magnitude of regulatory measures in practice.
Finally, our paper presents a numerical solution method for DSGE models
with occasionally binding endogenous constraints that extends the endogenous
gridpoints method of Carroll (2006). This method allows us to solve such models
in an e¢ cient way and may enable researchers to analyze more complex models
than what has been computationally feasible in the existing DSGE literature
with endogenous constraints, ultimately producing policy guidance on richer
3and more realistic models of the economy.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the assumptions
of the model. Section 3 compares the laissez-faire equilibrium with a social
planner. Section 4 presents a calibration of our model and explores its quan-
titative implications. Section 5 discusses extensions of the benchmark model,
and section 6 concludes.
2 The model
We consider a group of identical atomistic individuals in in￿nite discrete time
t = 0;1;2;:::. The individuals are indexed by i 2 [0;1]. The utility of individual









where u(￿) is strictly concave and satis￿es the Inada conditions. We will gener-





These individuals (the insiders) receive two kinds of income, the payo⁄ of
an asset that can serve as collateral, and an endowment income. Insider i
maximizes his utility under the budget constraint
ci;t + ai;t+1pt +
wi;t+1
R
= (1 ￿ ￿)yt + ai;t (pt + ￿yt) + wi;t; (2)
where ai;t is the insider￿ s holdings of the collateral asset at the beginning of
period t and pt is its price; wi;t is the individual￿ s wealth at the start of period
t; yt is total income in period t (the same for all individuals) and ￿yt is the
share of that income that comes from the asset. For example, if the collateral
asset were productive capital used in a Cobb-Douglas production function, and
labor were provided by outsiders, ￿ would be the exponent of capital in the
production function. Wealth is invested with outside investors who have an
inde￿nite demand/supply for risk-free bonds at the safe interest rate r = R￿1.
Wealth may be negative, in which case insiders sell debt to outside investors.
Total income yt follows a stochastic process which, for the sake of simplic-
ity, we will assume to be identically and independently distributed, although it
would be straightforward to extend the analysis to the case where it is Markov.1
Assuming an i.i.d. process for yt is not too restrictive given that, in the cali-
bration, we will consider shocks that represent rare crises rather than business
cycle ￿ uctuations.2
1The only di⁄erence, in the Markov case, is that the policy functions will also depend on
the current level of y in addition to the level of wealth w.
2We could also introduce growth into the model. The model with growth, once detrended,
would be isomorphic to the model presented here.
4The collateral asset is not reproducible and the available stock of asset is
normalized to 1. The asset can be exchanged between insiders in a perfectly
competitive market, but cannot be sold to outsiders: ai;t must be equal to 1
in a symmetric equilibrium where all insiders behave in the same way. We do
not allow insiders to sell the asset to outsiders and rent it back because insiders
derive bene￿ts from the control rights that ownership provides. This restriction
could be relaxed to some extent, but we need a restriction of this form for
insiders to issue collateralized debt.
Furthermore, we assume that the only ￿nancial instrument that can be
traded between insiders and outsiders is uncontingent one period debt. This
assumption can be justi￿ed e.g. on the basis that shocks to the insider sector
are not veri￿able and cannot be used to condition payments, and that short-
term debt provides insiders with adequate incentives. This feature corresponds
to common practice across a wide range of ￿nancial relationships.3
After rolling over his debt in period t, we assume that the representative
insider faces a moral hazard problem: he has the option to invest in a scam that
allows him to remove his future asset and endowment income from the reach of
his current creditors. This would allow him to default on his debts next period
without facing a penalty.
We assume that outsiders cannot coordinate to punish the agent by excluding
him from borrowing in future periods. However, they can observe the scam in
the current period and take the insider to court before the scam is completed.
If they do so, they can seize a quantity of good   plus a fraction ￿ < 1 of the
insider￿ s asset, where the inequality captures imperfect legal enforcement. Since
the asset cannot be held by outsiders, they re-sell them to other insiders at the
prevailing market price pt. This implies the following incentive compatibility
constraint for insiders to refrain from the scam:
wi;t+1
R
+   + ￿pt ￿ 0: (3)
This constraint is similar to that in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). The value of
the collateral asset determines how much debt insiders are able to roll over. We
assume that subject to this constraint, debt issued in period t is repaid with
certainty in period t + 1.
Constraint (3) could be speci￿ed in di⁄erent ways. For example, it could
involve a fraction of the collateral asset held by the borrower at the beginning
or the end of the period, or be a nonlinear increasing function of pt. The only
important assumption, to obtain the debt-asset de￿ ation mechanism at the core
of the model, is that the credit constraint depends on the current-period market
price of the asset, pt.4
3More generally, the ￿ndings of Korinek (2010) suggest that our results on excessive ex-
posure to binding constraints would continue to hold when insiders have access to costly
state-contingent ￿nancial contracts.
4In our simple setup of an endowment economy, ￿nancial ampli￿cation dynamics do not
arise if the constraint depends solely on future asset prices: an exogenous tightening of the
constraint would reduce borrowing today and lead to increased future wealth and higher fu-
53 Laissez-faire vs. Social Planner
We characterize the symmetric laissez-faire equilibrium and compare it to the
social planner solution. First, we derive the equilibrium conditions (section
3.1). We then present some considerations on equilibrium multiplicity and the
possibility of self-ful￿lling asset price and debt busts (section 3.2). Finally,
section 3.3 focuses on the case where saving is determined by a social planner.
3.1 Equilibrium conditions under laissez-faire
We derive in the appendix the ￿rst-order conditions for the optimization prob-
lem of an insider i. We then use the fact that in a symmetric equilibrium, all
individuals are identical and hold one unit of collateral asset (8i;t ai;t = 1).
Variables without the subscript i refer to the representative insider (or equiva-
lently, to aggregate levels, since the mass of insiders is normalized to 1). This
gives the following two conditions
u0(ct) = ￿t + ￿REt [u0(ct+1)]; (4)
pt = ￿
Et [u0(ct+1)(￿yt+1 + pt+1)]
u0(ct)
; (5)
where ￿t is the costate variable for the borrowing constraint. The ￿rst equation
is the Euler condition and the second one is the standard asset pricing equation.
The equilibrium is characterized by a set of functions mapping the state
of the economy into the endogenous variables. Given that yt is i.i.d., we can
summarize the state by one variable, the beginning-of-period liquid net wealth
excluding the value of the collateral asset,
mt ￿ yt + wt:
We do not include the asset in the de￿nition of net wealth because its price, pt,





= yt + wt; (6)
and the collateral constraint (3) can be written, in aggregate form,
ct ￿ mt +   + ￿pt: (7)
ture consumption, which raises the level of future asset prices, thereby relaxing the constraint,
leading to ￿nancial deceleration. In a model such as Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) that includes
investment in capital and a complementary asset in ￿xed supply (land), ￿nancial ampli￿-
cation also arises with a constraint involving future asset prices ￿ai;t+1pt+1: an exogenous
tightening of the constraint would reduce current capital investment, making complementary
land less valuable in the future and therefore reducing its price, which in turn tightens the
constraint further. However, adding investment as an additional endogenous state variable to
our nonlinear stochastic model setup would increase the computational burden by an order of
magnitude.
6The equilibrium, thus, is characterized by three non-negative functions,
c(m), p(m) and ￿(m) such that
c(m) = min
n















where next-period values are denoted with primes. The transition equation for
net wealth is
m0 = y0 + R(m ￿ c(m)): (11)
3.2 Multiple equilibria
Many papers, in the dynamic optimization literature on consumption and sav-
ing, compute the equilibrium policy functions by iterating on the ￿rst-order
conditions, under the assumption that this method converges towards policy
functions that exist and are unique.5 However, we cannot make such an as-
sumption here as our model generically gives rise to equilibrium multiplicity.
We give in this section a heuristic account of the mechanism underlying multi-
plicity and of the conditions that ensure uniqueness.6
The multiplicity comes from the self-reinforcing loop that links consumption
to the price of the collateral. In the constrained regime, a fall in the price of the
collateral asset decreases the insiders￿level of consumption, which in turn tends
to depress the price of the asset. This loop, which is essential for our results
since it explains the ￿nancial magni￿cation of real shocks, may also￿ if its e⁄ect
is strong enough￿ lead to self-ful￿lling crashes in the price of the asset.
More formally, the loop linking consumption to the asset price is captured by
equations (5) and (7). Assuming that the policy functions c(m), p(m) and ￿(m)
apply in the following period, equation (5) implicitly de￿nes the asset price as
a function of the state and of current consumption,
^ p(m;c) = ￿E [u0(c(m0))(￿y0 + p(m0))]c￿; (12)
where the expectation is taken conditional on m and c, with m0 = y0+R(m ￿ c).
The credit constraint (7) can then be written
c ￿ m +   + ￿^ p(m;c): (13)
5See Zeldes (1989) for an early example. Stokey et al (1989) present several ￿xed-point
theorems guaranteeing that the equilibrium exists, is unique, and can be obtained by iterat-
ing on the problem￿ s ￿rst-order conditions. However, the models considered in most of the
literature (including Zeldes￿ ) do not satisfy the conditions under which those theorems are
applicable￿ see the discussion in Carroll (2008).
6We are not aware of papers giving general conditions under which the equilibrium is
unique in models of the type considered here (i.e., extensions of Carroll￿ s (2008) analysis to
the case with endogenous credit constaints).
7The right-hand side of (13) is increasing in c because the credit constraint
on each individual is relaxed by a higher level of aggregate consumption that
raises the price of the asset.7 Multiplicity may arise if the left-hand side and
the right-hand side of (13) intersect for more than one level of c.
We further explore the multiplicity of equilibria in the remainder of this
section by considering a special case of the model that can be solved (almost
completely) in closed form: the case where y is constant and ￿R = 1. We
summarize the main results below (the details can be found in the appendix).
We derive the equilibrium for t = 1;2::: starting from an initial level of
wealth m1. It is easy to show that from period 2 onwards, the economy is in an





The economy is constrained in period 1 if and only if the initial level of net
wealth is lower than a threshold ￿ m. The function ^ p(￿;￿) in period 1 is given by
^ p(m1;c1) = punc ￿ min
￿￿
c1





Figure 1 illustrates the case with multiple equilibria by showing the variations
of both sides of (13) with c1. The unconstrained equilibrium (point A) coexists
with a constrained equilibrium featuring lower levels for consumption and the
asset price (point C).8 The multiplicity comes from the fact that the slope of
the r.h.s. of (13) is larger than 1 over some range. Then a one-dollar fall in
aggregate consumption tightens the credit constraint by more than one dollar
for each individual, allowing a self-ful￿lling downward spiral in consumption
and the price of the asset.
As shown in the appendix, the equilibrium is unique if and only if ￿ is small
enough,
￿ ￿








For the parameter values used to construct Figure 1, for example, equilibrium
uniqueness is ensured by taking ￿ ￿ 0:089. A small ￿ contains the strength of
the ampli￿cation e⁄ects below the level where it leads to multiple equilibria.
Equilibrium multiplicity, as we will show in section 4.2, is likely to be relevant
for highly-leveraged institutions in the ￿nancial sector. However, it raises a
number of issues (in particular, how the equilibrium is selected) that we prefer
to leave aside for now. We will thus ensure that the equilibrium is unique by
assuming su¢ ciently low values of ￿.
7This is captured by the factor c￿ on the r.h.s. of (12). However, because of the other
terms in m0, the sign of the variations of ^ p with c is a priori ambiguous.
8The ￿gure was constructed by giving parameters R, ￿, ￿, and   the same values as in our
benchmark calibration (given in Table 1). In addition we took y = 1, m1 = ￿1:3 and ￿ = 0:2.
There is one more intersection (point B) between A and C. However, point B corresponds
to an unstable equilibrium in the sense that a one dollar change in aggregate consumption
changes the maximum level of individual consumption by more than one dollar, so that the
economy would tip toward points A or C following a small perturbation in consumption.














Figure 1: L.h.s. and r.h.s. of equation (13) (y constant and ￿R = 1)
3.3 Social planner
We assume that the social planner of the economy determines the amount of
insiders￿borrowing, but does not directly interfere in asset markets￿ that is,
the social planner takes as given that insiders trade the collateralizable asset at
a price that is determined by their private optimality condition (5). The social
optimum di⁄ers from the laissez-faire equilibrium because the social planner
internalizes that future asset prices and insiders￿borrowing capacity depend on
the aggregate level of debt accumulated by insiders. A possible motivation for
this setup is that decentralized agents are better than the planner at observing
the fundamental payo⁄s of ￿nancial assets, while only the social planner has
the capacity of internalizing the costs of debt de￿ ation dynamics that may arise
from high levels of debt.
In period t, the social planner chooses the wealth level of the representa-
tive insider, wt+1, before the asset market opens at time t. The asset market
remains perfectly competitive, i.e., individual market participants optimize on
at+1 subject to their budget constraints. We look for time-consistent equilibria
in which the social planner optimizes on wt+1 taking the future policy functions
c(m) and p(m) as given. (Although we do not change the notation, those policy
functions are not the same as in the laissez-faire equilibrium.)
Through savings, the social planner determines the price of the asset, which
at time t is given by
pt = ^ p(mt;mt ￿ wt+1=R)
where the function ^ p(￿;￿) is given by equation (12).
9Since insiders are still subject to the collateral constraint (3), the social
planner sets w0 subject to
w0
R
+   + ￿^ p(m;m ￿ w0=R) ￿ 0: (17)
If ￿ is small enough to avoid multiple equilibria (as we have assumed), the left-
hand side increases with w0, so that this inequality determines a lower bound
on aggregate wealth (i.e., an upper bound on aggregate debt). Then the social
planner￿ s credit constraint can be rewritten in reduced form,
w0
R
+   + ￿￿ p(m) ￿ 0; (18)
where ￿ p(m) is the level of p(m;m ￿ w0=R) for which (17) is an equality. Note
that by de￿nition, we have ￿ p(m) = p(m) for all the levels of m in which the
social planner￿ s constraint is binding.
The social planner solves the same optimization problem as decentralized
agents, except that he takes at = 1 as given in the aggregate budget constraint,
and that his credit constraint is given by (18). As shown in the appendix, the
social planner￿ s Euler equation is,
u0(ct) = ￿t + ￿REt (u0(ct+1) + ￿t+1￿ p0(mt+1)): (19)
By comparing (4) and (19) and noting that p0(mt+1) > 0, one can see that
the social planner raises saving above the laissez-faire level if there is a risk of
binding ￿nancial constraints next period Et￿t+1 > 0. The planner￿ s wedge is
proportional to the expected product of the shadow cost of the credit constraint
times the derivative of the debt ceiling with respect to wealth. This re￿ ects that
the social planner internalizes the endogeneity of next period￿ s asset price and
credit constraint to this period￿ s aggregate saving.
With the social planner, precautionary savings is augmented by a systemic
component￿ the social planner implements a policy of macro-prudential saving.
This does not come from the fact that the central planner estimates risks better
than individuals. Decentralized agents are aware of the risk of credit crunch and
maintain a certain amount of precautionary saving (they issue less debt than
if this risk were absent). But they do not internalize the contribution of their
precautionary savings to reducing the systemic risk coming from the debt-asset
de￿ ation spiral.
The social planner￿ s Euler equation also provides guidance for how the so-
cially optimal equilibrium can be implemented via taxes on borrowing. Decen-
tralized agents undervalue the social cost of debt by the term ￿Et [￿t+1p0(mt+1)]
on the right-hand side of the social planner￿ s Euler equation (19), which depends
on the level of wealth mt. The planner￿ s equilibrium can be implemented by a
Pigouvian tax ￿t = ￿ (mt) on borrowing that is rebated as a lump sum transfer
Tt = ￿￿twt+1=R:
ct = yt + wt ￿
wt+1
R
(1 ￿ ￿t) + Tt: (20)
10The tax introduces a wedge in the insiders￿Euler equation,
(1 ￿ ￿t)u0(ct) = ￿t + ￿REt [u0 (ct+1)];





where all variables are evaluated at the social optimum.
The tax raises saving only if the economy is unconstrained under the social
planner so that consumption allocations are determined by the Euler equation
of insiders. If the economy is constrained, consumption and saving are deter-
mined by the binding constraint. As a result, the social planner equilibrium is
unchanged if we lower ￿(m) to zero in constrained states m where ￿(m) > 0.
4 Quantitative Exploration
We now turn the attention to the quantitative implications of the model. Sec-
tions 4.1 and 4.2 respectively present our numerical resolution method and our
calibration. Section 4.3 discusses the results of a numerical simulation with
booms and busts in the asset price and in credit ￿ ows. The last section presents
some sensitivity analysis.
4.1 Numerical resolution
In order to generate a persistent motive for borrowing, we need to assume that
insiders are impatient relative to outsiders, i.e.,9
￿R < 1:
We can make conjectures about the form of the solution by analogy with the
deterministic case studied in the previous section. We consider equilibria that
are unique and in which the consumption function m 7! c(m) is a continuously
increasing function of wealth. Let us denote by m the level of wealth for which
consumption is equal to zero,
c(m) = 0:
By analogy with the deterministic case, we would expect the insiders to be
credit-constrained in a wealth interval m 2 [m;m], and to be unconstrained for
m ￿ m. It is not di¢ cult to see that the lower threshold must be equal to
m = ￿ :
This results from the facts that c(m) ￿ m +   + ￿p, and that p converges to
zero as c goes to zero (by equation (5)). Since m = y + w must be larger than
￿  and the level of w is set before the realization of y, we must also have
w +   + miny ￿ 0:
9With trend growth at a growth factor G, we could allow ￿R ￿ 1 as long as ￿RG1￿￿ < 1.
11The upper threshold, m, above which insiders are unconstrained must be deter-
mined numerically.
The numerical resolution method is an extension of the endogenous grid
points method of Carroll (2006) to the case where the credit constraint is en-
dogenous. The procedure performs backwards time iteration on the agent￿ s
optimality conditions. We de￿ne a grid w for next period wealth levels w0
and combine the next period policy functions with agent￿ s optimality condi-
tions to obtain current period policy functions until the resulting functions con-
verge. The di⁄erence with Carroll (2006) is that the threshold level at which
the borrowing constraint becomes binding is endogenous. This implies that
the minimum level of wealth is itself a function of the state, which is obtained
by iterating on the asset pricing equation (10). The details of the numerical
resolution method are provided in the appendix.
4.2 Calibration
We assume that the process for income is binomial: total income is high (equal
to yH) with probability 1￿￿, or low (equal to yL) with probability ￿. The high
state is the normal state that prevails most of the time, whereas the realization
of the low state is associated with a bust in the asset price and in credit, which
occurs infrequently. Thus, we calibrate our model by reference to rare and large
events rather than real business cycle ￿ uctuations. We will assume that a bust
occurs once every twenty years on average.
Our benchmark calibration is reported in Table 1. The riskless real interest
rate is set to 3 percent. The discount factor is set to 0.96, a value that is low
enough to induce the insiders to borrow and expose themselves to the risk of a
credit crunch. The risk aversion parameter is equal to 2, a standard value in
the literature.
Table 1. Benchmark calibration
￿ R ￿ ￿ yL yH ￿ ￿  
0:96 1:03 2 0:2 0:969 1 0:05 0:046 1:97
The other parameters have been calibrated by reference to the experience of
the US small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in 2008-09. We have also looked
at other US sectors (the household sector and the non￿nancial corporate sector)
in order to obtain plausible ranges of variation for the parameters. We discuss
the case of the US ￿nancial sector at the end of this section.
The relevant data for the US non￿nancial sectors are shown in Table 2.10
For each sector we report the change in the value of assets and the change in
10The source is the Federal Reserve￿ s Flow of Funds database. The data for Households,
SMEs and Corporations respectively come from Table B.100 (Households and Nonpro￿t Or-
ganizations), Table B.102 (Nonfarm Non￿nancial Corporate Business) and Table B.103 (Non-
farm Noncorporate Business). The nonfarm noncorporate business sector comprises partner-
ships and limited liability companies, sole proprietorships and individuals who receive rental
income. This sector is often thought to be composed of small ￿rms, although some of the
partnerships included in the sector are large companies. More importantly for our purpose,
12debt during a one-year time window centered on the peak of the crisis (the fall
of 2008). For households and SMEs we observe that the value of assets and debt
both fall, consistent with the model. Corporations also had a fall in asset value
but they were able to slightly increase their outstanding debt by issuing larger
amounts of corporate bonds, in spite of a contraction in bank lending. The
di⁄erence between SMEs and the corporate business sector, thus, is consistent
with the notion that the former are more vulnerable than the latter to a credit
crunch because they are more dependent on bank lending.
Table 2. Balance sheet data for US Households, SMEs and
Corporations (in $bn)
Assets Debt
2008Q2 2009Q2 Chg. 2008Q2 2009Q2 Chg.
Households 74,273 64,425 -13.3% 14,418 14,116 -2.1%
SMEs 11,865 10,409 -12.3% 5,410 5,343 -1.2%
Corporations 28,579 26,521 -7.2% 13,039 13,597 +4.3%
Table 3 shows our calibration of ￿, ￿,  , and yL for the three sectors covered
by Table 2 except US corporations. We do not include the US corporate sector
because, as mentioned above, its outstanding debt did not fall during the crisis.
The share of the asset in income, ￿, was inferred from the ratio of the asset
price to total income. Abstracting from the risk of bust, the price of the asset







The ratio p=y was proxied by taking the ratio of households￿asset holdings
to national income in the case of households, and the ratio of assets to value
added in the case of SMEs.12 Note that at 20 percent, our estimate of the share
of capital in SMEs￿value added is smaller than the share of capital income in
total GDP (or the value for the exponent of capital that is usually assumed when
calibrating a Cobb-Douglas production function), which is closer to 0:3. This
may re￿ ect the fact that SMEs are less capital intensive than large corporations,
or that a larger share of labor income goes to self-employed entrepreneurs.
￿rms in the nonfarm noncorporate business sector generally do not have access to capital
markets and, to a great extent, rely for their funding on loans from commercial banks and
other credit providers and on trade credit from other ￿rms.
11We veri￿ed numerically that the asset price during booms in our model is indeed closely
approximated by this formula.
12The data for national income and the value added of the noncorporate business sector
come from the Bureau of Economic Analysis￿NIPA data (annual, 2008).
13Table 3. Parameter values for US households and SMEs
￿ ￿   yL
US households 24.5% 3.1% 307% 0.963
US SMEs 20.0% 4.6% 197% 0.969
The two parameters in the collateral constraint,   and ￿, were calibrated
using the information in Table 2.13 The value of ￿ was estimated by dividing
the fall in debt by the fall in asset value between the second quarter of 2008
and the second quarter of 2009.14 Abstracting again from the risk of a bust,
the ratio of debt to asset value converges to  =p + ￿ =
 (1￿￿)










where d=p is the ratio of debt to asset value. We proxied d=p by taking the ratio
of debt to total assets in the second quarter of 2008 for the two US sectors. We
then applied formula (23) using the values of ￿ and ￿ derived before and y = 1.
Finally, income was normalized to 1 in the high state and yL was calibrated
so as to reproduce the fall in asset value observed in the data in the event of a
bust (Table 2).15
We also considered the relevant parameter values for the US ￿nancial sector.
Unfortunately, the US Flow of Funds do not report the same balance sheet data
for the ￿nancial sector as for households or the non￿nancial business sectors.
The evidence presented by Adrian and Shin (2009) and Brunnermeier (2009)
suggests however that ￿ is much higher in the ￿nancial sector than in the rest
of the economy. Those authors show that the debt d of highly-leveraged in-
stitutions had short maturity and satis￿ed a margin requirement d ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)p
where p is the market value of the institution￿ s ￿nancial assets and ￿ is the
"margin," i.e., the fraction of asset holdings that is ￿nanced by the net worth
of the institution. In the ￿nancial sector, this margin often amounts to just a
few percentage points. Note that the margin requirement can also be expressed
in the form of our collateral constraint (3), with   = 0 and ￿ = 1 ￿ ￿: If ￿ is
close to 1, our model yields multiple equilibria.16 This points to the "high-￿"
case as perhaps the most relevant one if one wanted to apply our model to the
￿nancial sector. This is an interesting direction for future research but we focus
13Although it would not be di¢ cult to adjust those numbers for in￿ation, this would not
change the results if we used the same de￿ator for assets and liabilities. In addition, the
in￿ation rate was relatively low during this period.
14The resulting values for ￿ are rather low. We investigate an alternative explanation for
this ratio based on a model of long-term debt in section 5.2.
15The price of real estate is determined, in our model, by yt, which could be interpreted as
rental income or as the nonpecuniary utility of home ownership. The latter is not observable
and the former did not fall by enough in the recent crisis to explain a 30 percent fall in real
estate prices. The recent boom-bust in US real estate may have been to some extent the result
of a bubble, which our model does not capture as it does not entail any deviation of the asset
price from its fundamental value (conditional on the frictions).
16Multiple equilibria would perhaps not be a problem in normal times when the ￿nancial
assets are liquid and can be sold at no or little discount to outsiders, but multiplicity would
arise when ￿nancial assets loose their liquidity.















Figure 2: Policy functions c(m), p(m) and ￿(m).
here on the "low-￿" case, which ensures equilibrium uniqueness and makes the
model more applicable to the real sector.
4.3 Results
Figure 2 shows the policy functions c(m), p(m) and ￿(m) in the laissez-faire
equilibrium, for the benchmark calibration in Table 1, which represents the
SME sector. The equilibrium is unconstrained if and only if wealth is larger
than m = ￿1:26. In the unconstrained region, consumption, saving and the
price of the asset are all increasing with wealth. Higher wealth raises current
consumption relative to future consumption, which bids up the price of the
asset.
The levels of consumption and of the asset price vary more steeply with
wealth in the constrained region than in the unconstrained region, re￿ ecting the
collateral multiplier. Both consumption and the asset price fall to zero when
wealth is equal to ￿  = ￿1:97. By contrast, saving w0 decreases with wealth
in the constrained region. Higher wealth is associated with an increase in the
price of collateral, which relaxes the borrowing constraint on insiders and allows
them to roll over larger debts.
Figure 3 shows how saving depends on the level of wealth, w0(w), for the two
states y = yL; yH. One can obtain the curve for the low state by shifting the
curve for the high state to the right by ￿y = yH ￿yL. The curves intersect the
45o line in two points, AH and AL, which determine the steady state levels of
wealth conditional on remaining in each state, respectively denoted by wSS
H and
wSS
L . We observe that both AH and AL are on the downward-sloping branches





















Figure 3: Wealth dynamics
of each curve, which means that insiders borrow to the point where they are
￿nancially constrained in both states. Furthermore, insiders tend to borrow
more in the high steady state than in the low steady state (wSS
H < wSS
L ), which
they can do because the price of the collateral asset is higher.
Figure 3 also shows the dynamics of the economy when the steady state is
disturbed by a one-period fall in y. At the time of the shock, the economy jumps
up from point AH to point B, as insiders are forced to reduce their debts by
the fall in the price of collateral.17 The dynamics are then determined by the
saving function in the high state (since we have assumed that the low state lasts
only one period). The economy converges back to point AH. As it approaches
AH, wealth follows oscillations of decreasing amplitude. There are oscillations
because saving is decreasing with wealth in the constrained regime. There is
convergence because the slope of the saving curve is larger than ￿1 in point
AH for our benchmark calibration. This is not true for any calibration and the
equilibrium can exhibit cyclic or chaotic dynamics if ￿ is larger.
Figure 4 shows how the social planner (dashed line) increases saving rela-
tive to laissez-faire (solid line). The social planner saves more, implying that
the economy has a higher level of wealth and it is no longer ￿nancially con-
strained in the high steady state. The w0(w) line is closer to the 45o line with
the social planner, implying that following a one-period fall in y, the economy
reaccumulates debt at a lower pace than under laissez-faire.
Finally, Figure 5 illustrates the dynamics of the main variables of interest in
the social planner equilibrium with a stochastic simulation. The top panel shows
how consumption falls at the same time as output when there is a negative shock.
17The price of the collateral asset falls by 12.3 percent, from 4.81 to 4.22. Thus the borrowing
ceiling falls by ￿ ￿ 0:59 ￿ 0:03, which is the distance between AH and B.




























Figure 4: Policy functions of decentralized agents and planner




















Figure 5: Sample path of y, c, w0, p and ￿ in the planner￿ s equilibrium
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Figure 6: Dependence of macroprudential tax on interest rate
Even with the social planner, consumption falls by more than income because of
the fall in the price of collateral. Consumption increases above its long-run level
in the period after the shock, when the economy is unconstrained and insiders
inherit low debt from the credit crunch. The same pattern is observed for the
price of the collateral.
The bottom panel shows that the optimal Pigouvian tax rate is positive in
the high state and zero in the low state.18 Note the countercyclical pattern in
the tax rate: it falls in a bust, and does not immediately go back to the long-run
level after the bust because the economy temporarily has lower debt. The tax
rate increases with the economy￿ s vulnerability to a new credit crunch. If the
optimal tax rate is imposed on insiders, the decline in consumption when the
economy experiences a bust is reduced from -6.2 percent to -5.2 percent, and
the fall in the asset price during a bust is reduced from -12.3 percent to -10.3
percent.
If we calibrate our model using the parameter values reported in Table 3 for
the case of the US household sector, the results are similar to what we found
for the SME sector. The optimal magnitude of the macroprudential tax in the
high steady state is ￿SS
H = 0:48 percent for households.
4.4 Sensitivity analysis
We investigate how the optimal Pigouvian taxation depends on the parameters
of the economy. Figure 6 shows how ￿SS
H (the steady state rate of tax in the high
state) varies with the gross interest rate R. For R = 1:04, the optimal steady-
18We have set the tax to zero when the economy is ￿nancially constrained and the tax is
not binding.
18state tax in the economy is close to zero since ￿R ￿ 1 and insiders accumulate
a level of precautionary savings that is su¢ cient to almost entirely avoid debt
de￿ ation in case of busts.19
As the interest rate declines, it becomes more attractive for insiders to bor-
row and the economy becomes more vulnerable to debt de￿ ation in busts. Lower
interest rates therefore warrant higher macro-prudential taxation to o⁄set the
externalities that individual agents impose on the economy. This e⁄ect can be
large: the optimal tax rate is multiplied by two when the interest rate is reduced
from 2 percent to 1 percent.
For R ￿ 1:026 (when the line is dashed in Figure 6), the level of debt accu-
mulated by the social planner is high enough that the economy is constrained
even in the high steady state AH. This means that the social planner could lower
the tax rate to zero as soon as the economy becomes constrained￿ although he
could also maintain the tax rate at the level shown by the dashed line in Fig-
ure 6 or any level in between without changing the equilibrium. In this case,
macroprudential taxation matters only in the transition: its role is to slow down
the build-up of risk and ￿nancial vulnerability after a bust, and thus delay the
transition to the constrained regime where the tax no longer matters.
For low levels of R; the strong desire of private agents to borrow creates a
dilemma for the social planner. On the one hand, it increases the negative ex-
ternality associated with debt and so the optimal rate of taxation. On the other
hand, it is also costly in terms of welfare not to let private agents take advantage
of the low interest rate by borrowing more. In the context of this tradeo⁄, the
social planner may choose to let the economy go into the constrained regime
in booms that lasts long enough, i.e., to let aggregate debt be limited by the
constraint rather than by the tax.20
Figure 7 depicts the response of the steady-state tax rate ￿SS
H to changes
in the pledgeability parameter ￿. One interpretation for an increase in ￿ is a
process of ￿nancial liberalization or development that enables agents to collat-
eralize a greater fraction of their assets. We observe that the optimal tax rate
increases with the ability of private agents to borrow. The more insiders can
borrow against their collateral, the greater the potential ampli￿cation e⁄ects
when the borrowing constraint becomes binding. Thus, greater ￿nancial lib-
eralization or development warrants tighter macroprudential regulation over a
signi￿cant part of the parameter space.
The level of ￿nancial liberalization/development also determines whether
prudential taxation is transitory or permanent. For low levels of ￿, we ￿nd that
the ampli￿cation e⁄ects are small enough that the planner chooses a constrained
equilibrium in steady state and macroprudential taxation is only relevant in the
transition from busts to booms. By contrast, if ￿ ￿ :037, the planner implements
19Recall that we require ￿R < 1 for the economy to converge to a stationary equilibrium.
If ￿R ￿ 1, wealth is nonstationary and drifts toward in￿nity.
20This result echoes a point that has often been made by central bankers in the debate
on how monetary policy should respond to asset price booms: that the interest rate increase
required to discourage agents from borrowing would have to be so drastic to be e⁄ective that
it is undesirable (see, e.g., Bernanke, 2002).











  unconstrained constrained  




Figure 7: Dependence of macroprudential tax on ￿
an unconstrained equilibrium with a Pigouvian tax in steady state. This tax
reaches a maximum of almost 1 percent at ￿ = :08 ￿ for higher values of the
parameter the economy becomes so volatile that decentralized agents increase
their precautionary savings su¢ ciently so that the externality declines.21
Figures 8 and 9 show how the optimal tax varies with the size and probability
of the underlying shock. The optimal tax rate is not very sensitive to those
variables: it changes by less than 0.3 percent when the size of the income shock
varies between 0 and 10 percent and its probability varies between 0 and 20
percent. The sign of the variation is paradoxical. Figure 8 shows that ￿SS
H is
increasing with yL, i.e., the optimal rate of prudential taxation is decreasing with
the size of the income shock. This result comes from the endogenous response
of precautionary savings by private agents to increased riskiness in the economy.
As the size of the shock increases, insiders raise their own precautionary savings,
which alleviates the burden on prudential taxation. The tax rate is the highest
when the amplitude of the shock is the smallest, but again, these high tax rates
do not bind in equilibrium if the income shock is very small (below 2 percent).
We observe a similar pattern for the variation of the optimal tax with the
probability of a shock (Figure 9). The optimal tax rate is decreasing with ￿
because of the endogenous increase in private precautionary savings. The tax
is not binding (and could be set to zero in the long run) if the probability of
bust falls below 3 percent. Prudential taxation thus responds the most to "tail
risk", i.e., a risk that is realized with a small probability, but not so small that
even the social planner can ignore it in the long run. The long-run tax rate is
21As we emphasized in section 3.2, the economy experiences multiple equilibria for ￿ >
0:089.
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Figure 8: Dependence of macroprudential tax on magnitude of bust 1 ￿ yL
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Figure 9: Dependence of macroprudential tax on probability ￿ of bust
21binding and is at its maximum when the probability of shock is between 3 and
5 percent.
5 Extensions
We discuss four extensions of the basic model. In the ￿rst one, we assume that
the indebted agents are submitted to external ￿nancial shocks that abruptly
restrict their borrowing constraints. The second and third subsections expand
the range of liabilities by assuming that the insiders can issue equity or long-
term debt. The last extension looks at whether ex post bailout policies can
provide a good alternative to ex ante prudential taxation.
5.1 Fluctuations in Creditworthiness
It has been suggested (see e.g. Jermann and Quadrini, 2010) that the recent
global ￿nancial crisis was driven more by ￿ uctuations in the availability of credit
(￿￿nancial shocks￿ ) than by developments in the real economy (￿endowment
shocks￿ ). In our framework, the availability of credit is a function of the para-
meters   and ￿ in the borrowing constraint. We now assume that the economy
may be hit by shocks that reduce   rather than y.
As in our previous calibration, we choose our parameter values to replicate
the declines in credit and asset prices observed during the ￿nancial crisis of
2008/09. Income is now deterministic and equal to y = 1. The parameter  H
is calibrated so as to reproduce the pre-crisis debt-to-income ratio, and  L is
calibrated to match the observed fall in the asset price at the time of a bust.
This results in a pair of values ( L; H) = (1:94;1:97). The other parameters
remain the same as in Table 1.
We solve for the constrained planner￿ s problem in the model with credit
shocks and ￿nd that the behavior of the model economy is very similar to the
case of output shocks. A planner would impose an optimal Pigouvian tax on
borrowing of ￿SS
H = 0:61 percent if the economy has reached its steady state
during a boom. In a bust, the planner lowers the tax and slowly raises it back
to its high steady-state value as the economy re-accumulates debt.
The general magnitude of the externality￿ and by implication of optimal
policy measures targeted at internalizing it￿ therefore seems to depend not on
the source of shocks but on the extent of ampli￿cation when the borrowing
constraint becomes binding. The optimal policy measures in the economy are
similar as long as we calibrate the model in a way that reproduces similar
frequencies and magnitudes of crisis as our benchmark model with endowment
shocks.
5.2 Debt Maturity
We have observed in the data that outstanding debt fell by substantially less
than asset values in the US coporate and household sectors during the ￿nancial
22crisis. This implied a relatively low value of ￿ in the calibration. However,
the small sensitivity of outstanding debt to collateral value could be due to the
fact that a substantial fraction of the debt is medium- or long-term so that the
full impact of low collateral values on outstanding debt is observed over several
periods. We capture this idea in a tractable way by generalizing the collateral
constraint as follows,
wi;t+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)wi;t
R
+ ￿(  + ￿pt) ￿ 0:
The parameter ￿ represents the fraction of the debt principal that comes due in
any given period, i.e., the inverse of the duration of debt. The case of short-term
debt corresponds to ￿ = 1, which gives equation (3). In the general case ￿ < 1,
the collateral constraint applies only to the ￿ ow of new debt issued in period t.
We interpret 1=￿ as the duration of debt.
Iterating backwards, the new constraint can also be written
wi;t+1
R
+   + ￿￿
+1 X
s=0
(1 ￿ ￿)spt￿s ￿ 0:
In this formulation, the collateral constraint has the same form as before, except
that it involves the weighted average of past collateral prices. In a deterministic
steady-state with constant asset price pt, the constraint would simplify to our
original collateral constraint (3). However, the dynamic behavior of the economy
in case of shocks is modi￿ed: when the credit constraint binds, a unit decline in
the current asset price reduces debt only by a fraction ￿￿ as opposed to ￿ in our
benchmark model. This mitigates the debt de￿ ation dynamics in the economy.
Figure 10 illustrates how the optimal steady-state tax in the high state ￿H
SS
varies with debt duration for the parameters of our benchmark calibration as
listed in Table 1.22 As we increase debt duration by moving leftwards in the
graph from ￿ = 1, the debt de￿ ation e⁄ects that arise during binding constraints
are mitigated. As a result, insiders reduce their precautionary savings and
the externality of a given dollar of debt at ￿rst rises. For ￿ ￿ :78, busts are
su¢ ciently mild that a planner chooses not to insure against binding constraints
when the steady state is reached. In this region, a planner uses macroprudential
taxation only during the transition from a bust to the next boom in order to
slow down the build-up of risk.
An important e⁄ect of higher debt duration (lower ￿) is to make the econ-
omy more resilient in the sense of admitting higher values of ￿ without leading
to multiple equilibria￿ long-term debt insulates borrowers against self-ful￿lling
panics. We emphasized earlier that when debt is due yearly (￿ = 1), an insider
sector with ￿ > ^ ￿ ￿ 9% was vulnerable to multiple equilibria. As the duration
of debt 1=￿ increases, a smaller fraction of debt becomes due in every given
period, raising the threshold ^ ￿ and therefore mitigating the scope for multiple
22The derivation of the equilibrium with long-term debt and the numerical resolution
method are presented in Appendices A.4 and B.2.
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Figure 10: Dependence of macroprudential tax on inverse debt duration ￿
equilibria. This relationship is depicted in ￿gure 11. For example, for ￿ = 0:80
￿the typical loan-to-value ratio in the mortgage market, a unique equilibrium
is guaranteed as long as ￿ < 0:095, i.e. the duration of debt 1=￿ is greater
than 10:6. The duration of a 30-year mortgage with a ￿xed interest rate of
6% is 11:3, which satis￿es this condition. On the other hand, mortgages with
shorter duration, such as teaser loans that are meant to be re￿nanced sooner
because the interest rate is reset to punitive rates, make the equilibrium prone
to multiplicity.
5.3 Outside equity
We could assume that insiders can sell equity rather than debt. Let us assume
that the insider can sell a claim on a share st ￿ s of total income to outsiders.









= (1￿￿)yt+ai;t (pt + ￿yt)+wi;t￿si;tyt+(si;t+1￿si;t)e p:
It is easy to see that the insiders will always sell as much equity as possible,
which is a way for them to insure against their income risk (at no cost since
outsiders do not require a risk premium on equity) and bene￿t from the greater
patience of outsiders. Thus, st = s in every period. The introduction of equity
leads to a consumption boom, but the long-run equilibrium is the same as









Figure 11: Threshold ^ ￿ beyond which there are multiple equilibria
before except that total income is reduced by the factor (1 ￿ s). Our model is
homogenous of degree 1 in income y, aside from the borrowing constraint. In a
sample simulation in which we set ￿ s = :5, we found the optimal macroprudential
tax to be ￿SS
H = 0:59, which is very close to the level in our benchmark model
(0:56).
Although equity has better risk-sharing properties than debt, it is not used
to reduce risk in equilibrium. Insiders issue equity to increase their consump-
tion, leaving them with more liabilities and the same level of debt in the long
run. Allowing borrowers to issue equity, thus, does not reduce the need for the
prudential taxation of debt.
5.4 Bailouts
We have focused on the role of ex ante prudential policies, but real world policy
makers also resort to ex post policies, such as bailouts or market interventions
to support the price of assets. In our model, the social planner could accumulate
a bailout fund ￿nanced by a lump-sum tax in booms, which is used to make





= yt + wt + Tt;





where bt is the size of the bailout fund and Tt is the lump-sum transfer.
25We can show that if this policy does not change the set of periods during
which agents are constrained during the boom, it has absolutely no e⁄ect on the
equilibrium and welfare. This comes from a form of Ricardian equivalence: the
agents borrow more and exactly the amount that will leave them the same in the
bust as under laissez-faire. This result could be described, loosely speaking, as
"moral hazard" (since the agents respond to the bailout insurance by borrowing
more)￿ although this is not moral hazard in the strict sense of the term (there
is no hidden action).
To see this more formally, note that by substituting Tt from the two equations
above one obtains the budget constraint (6) with private wealth wt replaced by
total wealth wt + bt. Thus, any state-contingent bailout policy b(mt) can be
undone by private agents by setting their wealth to e w(mt) = w(mt) ￿ b(mt)
where w(mt) is the laissez-faire policy function. Such a policy satis￿es the
￿rst-order conditions as well as the constraints if
w(mt) ￿ b(mt)
R
+   + ￿p(mt) ￿ 0;
so that the equilibrium remains the same as laissez-faire in spite of the social
planner￿ s intervention.
The inequality above is satis￿ed if the bailout fund is reduced to zero in the
constrained states and is not too large in the unconstrained states. The only
way in which such a bailout policy might work is by increasing the size of the
bailout fund in booms all the way to the point where private agents can no
longer undo the social planner￿ s accumulation because they hit their collateral
constraints.
Our bailout irrelevance result is relevant to current policy debates from sev-
eral perspectives. First, let us discuss the proposal that regulators require banks
to pay into an "insurance fund" from which future bailouts are to be ￿nanced.
If the contribution of each bank is set proportional to its contribution to sys-
temic risk, then such a requirement plays the same role as ex ante prudential
taxation in our model. The ex post provision of insurance per se is not rele-
vant since banks can easily undo it by undertaking more risk ex ante. Some
authors have argued that capital insurance should be provided by the private
sector, for example, through contingent capital requirements (Kashyap, Rajan
and Stein, 2008). Our ￿ndings suggest that this is only useful if regulators
mandate a su¢ cient level of insurance to make banks internalize their systemic
externalities.
Our result is also relevant to the debates on capital controls versus reserve ac-
cumulation in dealing with volatile capital ￿ ows to emerging market economies.
The o¢ cial conventional wisdom seems to be that countries should respond to
a capital in￿ ow ￿rst by accumulating precautionary reserves, and with capital
controls only as a second line of defense if the ￿rst policy is insu¢ cient (Ostry et
al, 2010). However, our model suggests that the private sector can easily undo
the public accumulation of reserves by borrowing more abroad, and that the
accumulation of reserves will have an e⁄ect only to the extent that it pushes do-
mestic borrowers against their credit constraints. By contrast, capital controls
26address the underlying externalities much more directly, and can be di⁄erenti-
ated across di⁄erent types of capital ￿ ows to take into account their contribution
to systemic risk.
6 Conclusion
This paper has developed a simple model to study the optimal policy responses
to booms and busts in credit and asset prices. We found that decentralized
agents do not internalize that their borrowing choices in boom times render the
economy more vulnerable to credit and asset price busts involving debt de￿ ation
in bust times. Therefore their borrowing imposes an externality on the economy.
In our baseline calibration, a social planner would impose on average an ex-ante
tax of half a percent per dollar on borrowing so as to reduce the debt burden
and mitigate the decline in consumption in case of crisis.
The analysis presented in this paper could be extended in several directions.
First, it would be interesting to analyze the case where the sensitivity of the
credit constraint to the collateral price (parameter ￿) is large enough to produce
multiple equilibria and self-ful￿lling asset price busts. This is the relevant case
to consider if one wants to apply the model to leveraged ￿nancial institutions
in systemic liquidity crises. The optimal Pigouvian tax is likely to be higher
than with the calibrations that we have considered in this paper, but it is un-
clear whether the optimal tax should be binding in the long-run steady states.
The optimal taxation might be implemented through the kind of countercyclical
capital surcharges that are being discussed in the debates about the "macropru-
dential regulation" of banks. In addition, policies to remove the bad equilibria,
such as lending-in-last-resort, may be appropriate.
Another direction of enquiry would take into account the e⁄ects of busts in
asset prices and credit on production and income. Our model focused on the
cost of excessive consumption volatility taking income as exogenous. In the real
world, however, busts in credit and asset prices are likely to a⁄ect investment
and other productive expenditures. It is not obvious a priori that investment will
fall below the optimal level in a bust if it is triggered by a negative productivity
shock, since in this case the demand for investment will fall at the same time
as the credit constraint is tightened. The investment channel, however, might
magnify the welfare cost of the ￿re sale externality in busts, and justify more
aggressive prudential taxation in booms.
In addition, asset price and credit busts might have a permanent negative
e⁄ect on long-run output. The data suggest that output does not generally
catch up with its pre-crisis trend following a ￿nancial crisis (IMF, 2009). This
will be the case, in our model, if the collateral constraint reduces productivity-
enhancing expenditures. The welfare cost of asset price busts is likely to be
larger in this case, leading to larger welfare gains from prudential taxation in
booms, and a higher optimal Pigouvian tax level.
Finally, one would like to incorporate money to the model in order to derive
insights for the debate on whether and how monetary policy should respond
27to credit and asset price booms. If there is nominal stickiness, a monetary
restriction that raises the real interest rate in the boom should have the same
macroprudential e⁄ect as the Pigouvian tax discussed in this paper. Such a
preemptive restriction may come at a cost for the other objectives of monetary
policy (e.g., in terms of in￿ ation), and may not be necessary or desirable if
the optimal Pigouvian taxation can be implemented independently of monetary
policy. If monetary policy is the only available instrument, however, it stands
to reason that it should be used with a prudential purpose in mind, at least at
the margin.
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30A Solution of Benchmark Model
A.1 Laissez-faire

















+   + ￿ps
io
:
Given CRRA utility, this implies the ￿rst-order conditions


















In a symmetric equilibrium with a representative agent, this gives (4) and
(5).
A.2 Deterministic case with ￿R = 1
In a steady state with ￿R = 1, equation (5) implies that the price of the asset
is given by (14). The collateral constraint is satis￿ed if and only if w=R +   +
￿punc ￿ 0, that is if wealth is larger than a threshold
m ￿ m ￿ y ￿ R(  + ￿punc):
A steady state equilibrium exists if and only if m1 ￿ m. In this equilibrium,
consumption is constant and given by
cunc(m1) = ￿y + (1 ￿ ￿)m1:
By contrast, if m1 < m, the economy is constrained in period 1. Equation
(5) and u0(ct) ￿ u0(ct+1) imply pt ￿ punc. Then w2=R = ￿  ￿ ￿p1 ￿ ￿  ￿
￿punc, implies m2 = y + w2 ￿ m so that there is an unconstrained steady state
equilibrium. We can assume that the economy is in this steady state equilibrium
from period 2 onwards and focus on the equilibrium in period 1.












in the constrained regime. Then using c2 = y + r(m1 ￿ c1) to substitute out c2
gives (15), which can also be written











31If ￿ ￿ 1 this is a strictly convex function of c1 for c1 ￿ cunc(m1), as shown on
Figure 1. Hence the slope of the r.h.s. of (13) reaches its maximum at the kink,

















As can be seen on Figure 1, equilibrium multiplicity is possible only if the uncon-
strained steady state equilibrium exists, which requires m1 ￿ m. In addition,
equilibrium multiplicity requires the slope of the r.h.s. of (13) to be larger than
1. To avoid multiplicity, it is necessary and su¢ cient that this slope be smaller









If this condition is satis￿ed, then the slope of the r.h.s. of (13) is lower than 1
everywhere, so that the equilibrium is unique. This is true not only for m1 =
m but also for any m1 ￿ m since the slope at the kink is decreasing in m1
(see equation (25)). Conversely, if this condition is not satis￿ed, then there is
multiplicity for m1 slightly below m. Using (25), condition (26) can be rewritten
as (16).
A.3 Social planner
The social planner maximizes the utility of the representative insider subject
to the budget constraint (2) and to the credit constraint (18), taking at = 1






















FOC (wt+1): u0(ct) = ￿t + ￿REt [u0(ct+1) + ￿￿t+1￿ p0(mt+1)].
If we solve the decentralized agent￿ s problem under a tax that requires the
agent to pay ￿t for every dollar borrowed as speci￿ed in budget constraint (20),
then the ￿rst order condition is
FOC (wt+1): (1 ￿ ￿t)u0(ct) = ￿t + ￿REt [u0(ct+1)].
This condition replicates the ￿rst-order condition of the planner that is given
above if the tax rate is set such that
￿t + ￿REt [u0(ct+1) + ￿￿t+1p0(mt+1)] = ￿t + ￿REt [u0(ct+1)] + ￿tu0 (ct).
Simplifying this expression yields the formula (21) given in the text.
32A.4 Long-Term Debt
The Lagrangian of our setup extended to long-term debt that repays a fraction

















wi;s+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)wi;s
R
+ ￿ (  + ￿ps)
￿￿
:
This changes the ￿rst-order condition on ws+1 to
FOC (wi;s+1) : u0 (ci;s) + ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)Es [￿i;s+1] = ￿REs [u0 (ci;s+1)] + ￿i;s:
Taking on more debt now not only has the bene￿t of raising current consump-
tion, but also of having to roll over (1 ￿ ￿) less debt next period, which is
valuable if the borrowing constraint next period is binding. The remaining
￿rst-order conditions are unchanged.
When including long-term debt, we can no longer summarize the state vari-
ables in a single variable m = w + y, because w determines the level of debt
that comes due in the current period independently of y. All policy functions
are therefore functions of the pair of state variables (w;y).
The Euler equation of the planner who borrows in long-term debt is








B Numerical resolution method
B.1 Benchmark model
We present the numerical method in the case where income is i.i.d. and binomi-
ally distributed (y = yH or yL) but the method can easily be extended to the
case where y follows a Markov process with more than two states.
We ￿rst de￿ne a grid w for wealth. The minimum value in the grid is
wmin = ￿ ￿yL. In iteration step k, we start with a triplet of functions ck (m),
pk (m) and ￿k (m) where ck (m) and pk (m) are weakly increasing in m and
￿k (m) is weakly decreasing in m. For each w0 2 w we associate a quadruplet
(c;p;￿;m) under the assumption that the equilibrium is unconstrained. We
solve the system of optimality conditions from section 3.1 under the assumption








￿E fck(m0)￿￿ ￿ [￿y0 + pk (m0)]g
cunc(w0)￿￿ ;
￿
unc (w0) = 0;




In the same way, we can solve for the constrained branch of the system
for each w0 2 w s.t. w0=R ￿ ￿  under the assumption that the borrowing
constraint is binding in the current period as
pcon (w0) =




















We then determine the next period wealth threshold w such that the bor-




+   + ￿punc (w) = 0:
This is the lowest possible w0 that the economy can support (any lower level
would violate the collateral constraint). By construction of this threshold,
cunc (w) = ccon (w) for consumption as well as for the other policy variables. This
threshold gives the level of m that marks the frontier between the unconstrained
and the constrained regimes, m = munc (w) = mcon (w). The lowest possible
level of m is m = mcon (￿R ) = ￿ . One can check, using the equations
above, that any w0 2 [w;￿R ] can be mapped into one unconstrained quadru-
plet (cunc(w0); punc(w0); ￿
unc(w0); munc(w0)) and one constrained quadruplet
(ccon(w0); pcon(w0); ￿
con(w0); mcon(w0)).
We can construct the step-(k + 1) policy function ck+1 (m) for the interval
m ￿ m < m by interpolating on the pairs f(ccon(w0);mcon(w0))gw02w where
w0 2 [w;￿R ], and then for the interval m ￿ m by interpolating on the pairs
f(cunc(w0);munc(w0))gw02w for w0 ￿ w. The resulting consumption function
ck+1 (m) is again monotonically increasing in m. We proceed in the same man-
ner for the policy functions pk+1 (m) and ￿k+1 (m), which are, respectively,
monotonically increasing and decreasing in m. The iteration process is contin-
ued until the distance between two successive functions ck(m) and ck+1(m) (or
other policy functions) is su¢ ciently small.
The source code of the program is available at:
http://www.korinek.com/download/boombust.m
34B.2 Model with Long-Term Debt
When including long-term debt, all policy functions are functions of the pair
of state variables (w;y). We present the algorithm to solve for the laissez-faire
equilibrium (the case with social planner is similar). We modify the procedure





ck(w0;y0)￿￿ ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿k (w0;y0)
￿￿￿ 1
￿ ;
In the constrained solution, the following four equations have to be satis￿ed,
pcon (w0;y) = ￿














con (w0;y) = ccon (w0;y)




mcon (w0;y) = ccon(w0;y) +
w0
R




This is a system of four equations with four unknowns: pcon (w0;y), ccon (w0;y),
￿
con (w0;y) and wcon (w0;y). It can be solved numerically, and also analytically
in the case ￿ = 2. We substitute wcon (w0;y) from the fourth equation into the










In combination with the second equation this yields
[ccon (w0;y)]
￿ +
￿(1 ￿ ￿)[ccon (w0;y)] + w0 ￿ R￿1+￿




￿￿ ￿ [￿y0 + pk (w0;y0)]
o = 0.
For ￿ = 2, this is a quadratic equation that can be solved as
ccon (w0;y) =
1 ￿ ￿









R + (1 ￿ ￿)y + ￿R 
￿￿￿RE fck(w0;y0)￿￿ ￿ [￿y0 + pk (w0;y0)]g
:





R ￿ 1 + ￿
R




ck(w0;y0)￿￿ ￿ [￿y0 + pk (w0;y0)]
￿
:










￿￿ ￿ [￿y0 + pk (w0;y0)]
o.
35